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The Optimal Mix of Monetary and Climate Policy  
Chuanqi Chen1, Dongyang Pan2 
 
Abstract 
Given central banks' recent interest in "greening the financial system", this research 
theoretically investigates the relationship between monetary and climate policy and 
tries to find their “optimal mix”. We build an Environmental Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (E-DSGE) model with the consideration of illegal emission which 
is pervasive in many countries. According to the model, we find: First, the dynamic of 
monetary policy is influenced by the selection of regimes of climate policy and the 
effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation. Second, the coefficients in 
the traditional Taylor rule of monetary policy can be better set to enhance welfare when 
a certain regime of climate policy is given in the economy. This helps find the 
constrained optimums of a policy mix. Third, if the mitigation of climate change is 
augmented into the target of monetary policy, the economy’s welfare can be enhanced. 
However, under certain circumstances, a dilemma in such monetary policy makes it 
incompatible with the traditional mandate of central bank.  
Keywords: Optimal Mix, Monetary Policy, Environmental Policy, E-DSGE  
 
1. Introduction 
In 2015, a report published by the British central bank3 proposed that climate 
change could become a risk that affect the financial stability and the economic 
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development. Since then and especially after the sign of Paris Agreement, climate 
change and the broader environmental issue have become a factor of consideration for 
many central banks. By forming the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for 
Greening the Financial System (NGFS)4 in 2017 and the International Platform on 
Sustainable Finance (IPSF) in 2019, they are starting to investigate ways to manage the 
risk from climate change and to support the green economy. In particular, China’s 
central bank already started to use “green monetary policy” in 2018 as the pioneer5. 
In academia, the accelerated climate change and environmental problem has 
brought new waves of research in “environmental macroeconomics” (Hassler et. al, 
2016). Since 2010, a group of theoretical frameworks are founded to explain how 
environmental risks and relevant policies could affect the macro-economy by the newly 
developed “Environmental Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (E-DSGE)” 
models. Angelopoulos (2010), Fischer and Springborn (2011), Heutel (2012), Golosov 
et. al (2014), Doda (2014), Annicchiarico and DiDio (2015), Dissou and Karnizova 
(2016) investigated relationships between greenhouse gas (GHG)/pollutant emission 
and business cycle by setting GHG/pollutant as an externality in the economy and found 
how environmental policies can influence the fluctuation or the growth of economy. 
Some other researchers tried to find the role of weather in economic volatility. Chen 
(2014) built a model with weather shocks embedded finding its good explanatory power 
on China’s business cycle. Gallic and Vermandel (2019) find weather shocks account 
for a very significant proportion of economic volatility in the long-run. Of the policy 
related researches, two regimes of environmental policy, cap-and-trade (permitting) and 
taxing, are mainly focused on. For example, Golosov et. al (2014) tried to find the 
optimal tax for fossil fuel. Dissou and Karnizova (2016) compared the different 
implications of reducing CO2 emissions with carbon permits and with carbon taxes.  
Only until recently, has the monetary policy been linked with the environment issue 
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in macroeconomics. These two things are seemingly unrelated at first glance. However, 
it is not true. According to the above research, environment factors and policies are 
proven to influence the fluctuation or the growth of the economy which is just the thing 
that monetary policy cares about. Hence, some researchers have started to ask questions 
about the role of central bank and monetary policy in a changing climate. Early 
discussions including Haavio (2010), Campiglio (2016), Ma (2017) and McKibbin et. 
al (2017) qualitatively explained the linking mechanism between monetary policy and 
climate change. By E-DSGE model, Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017) studied the mix 
of monetary and climate policy at the first. They compared three specific mixes and 
showed that the optimal monetary policies should be slightly tightened when GHG 
emission is considered. Economides and Xepapadeas (2018) compared the monetary 
policy with and without the consideration of climate change in the model and found 
that the reaction of monetary policy to economic shocks will be affected by the climate 
change. Punzi (2019) introduced borrowing constraints and heterogeneous production 
sectors into the model to investigate the green financing activity, finding that only the 
differentiated capital requirement policy can sustain green financing. Huang and Punzi 
(2019) incorporated financial friction according to Bernanke et. al (1999) and found 
that environmental regulations can accelerate the risks that the financial system faces. 
There are 
Together with the global combat for a sustainable future, central banks are eager to 
know more about monetary policy and the environment. This includes the 
macroeconomic and financial stability implications of climate change, the relationship 
between monetary policy and climate change as well as climate policy, the way to 
encourage green finance, the cost and benefit of “green monetary policy” and many 
others6. The existing researches, including aforementioned works by Annicchiarico and 
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DiDio, Economides and Xepapadeas, Punzi and Huang, started to investigate these 
concerns. However, most concerns are still very new and have not been investigated 
deeply. 
In this research, we aim to investigate the specific concern of “the relationship 
between monetary and climate policy”. This is a continuation of Annicchiarico and 
DiDio (2017) and we will answer three new questions which can better inform central 
bank’s policy making process facing climate change. These questions are: (1) If and 
how the monetary policy is influenced by the climate policy? (2) If and how can 
monetary policy be improved when the climate policy is considered in the framework 
of analysis? Whether there is an optimal monetary policy? (3) Should central bank use 
monetary policy to proactively take care for the environment? By answering these 
questions, we can understand the way for monetary policy to cooperate with climate 
policy and the mechanism of conduction of the policy mix. 
Our method for research is an E-DSGE model based on Annicchiarico and DiDio 
(2017). Illegal emission and related regulation are additionally introduced. The basic 
DSGE model follows the standard New Keynesian framework. We introduce the 
“Environmental” features into the basic model by setting the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission from production, its negative externality on productivity and environmental 
policies that control emission. Considering the potential ineffectiveness of 
environmental regulation in many developing countries, we also introduce illegal 
(concealed) emission, potential penalty for it, and the effectiveness of enforcement of 
environmental regulation (EOEER) into the model. This is relaxing the hidden 
assumption of the perfect effectiveness of environmental regulation in most previous 
E-DSGE models. The relaxation of assumption is nontrivial since we find that EOEER 
is also a factor that influences the interaction between monetary and climate policy. 
Based on the E-DSGE model, we first mix monetary policy with different types of 
climate policy and compare these different mixes to see if the climate policy can 
influence the monetary policy. For comparison, the impulse responses of major 
economic and environmental variables after shock, the conditional welfare and 
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consumption equivalent under regimes with different mixes are calculated. The result 
shows that when monetary policy is mixed with different types of climate policy under 
different EOEER, its dynamic changes. Therefore, the design of monetary policy should 
consider these environmental factors. 
We then want to improve and optimise the mix of monetary and climate policy. 
However, it is found that there is no unconstrained optimal mix of monetary and climate 
policy that is implementable in the real-world. So, we turn to find the constrained 
optimal mix by optimising policy coefficients under given regimes. It is found that the 
Taylor rule coefficients in monetary policy can be optimised when climate policy is 
given. This optimisation is both practicable and desirable.  
We finally investigate a radically “climate-friendly” way to improve the policy mix, 
which can help find if it is good for central bank to use the monetary policy to 
proactively take care for the environment. This is to introduce a target for climate 
change mitigation into the Taylor rule of monetary policy. The results show that the 
economy’s welfare can be enhanced when the new target is augmented into monetary 
policy and the coefficient of such target is optimised. However, under certain 
circumstances, such monetary policy has a dilemma which makes it incompatible with 
the traditional mandate of central bank. This means that proactively using monetary 
policy to protect the environment is not always desirable. 
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 describes the modified E-DSGE model. 
Section 3 compares the mixes of monetary policy with different climate policy. Section 
4 investigates the optimisation of policy mixes. Sections 5 concludes. 
2. Model 
We construct an Environmental Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (E-
DSGE) model based on the New Keynesian framework. GHG emission from 
production, its negative externality on productivity and environmental policies that 
control emission are introduced following Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017). Illegal 
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(concealed) emission, potential penalty for it, and the effectiveness of enforcement of 
environmental regulation (EOEER) are innovatively set into the model. 
2.1 Household 
A representative household maximise its expected lifetime utility which is 
determined by consumption 𝐶𝑡 and labour 𝐿𝑡 and has a form of 𝔼0 {∑𝛽𝑡𝑆𝑡 (ln 𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑡1+𝜂1 + 𝜂)∞𝑡=0 } (1) 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor, 𝜂 ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of 
labour supply, 𝜇𝐿 > 0  is the coefficient of disutility of labour. 𝑆𝑡  represents the 
stochastic shocks of time-preference which follows ln 𝑆𝑡 = 𝜌𝑆 ln 𝑆𝑡−1 + (1 −𝜌𝑆) ln 𝑆 + 𝑒𝑆,𝑡 to evolve, where 0 < 𝜌𝑆 < 1 and 𝑒𝑆,𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑆2). 
The budget constraint of household is 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡 +𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the price of final good, 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐵𝑡+1 are the nominal quantity of riskless 
bond at period 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 , 𝑅𝑡 is the riskless interest rate of the bonds which is 
determined by the central bank, 𝑊𝑡  is the nominal wage of labour, 𝐷𝑡  denotes 
nominal dividend derived from enterprises, 𝑇𝑡  is the lump-sum transfer from 
government. 
At the optimum we have the following first-order conditions 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [𝑆𝑡+1𝑆𝑡 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1 (3) 𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 (4) 
where Πt+1 = 𝑃𝑡+1/𝑃𝑡  is the inflation of period t + 1 . Equation (1) is the Euler 
equation and (2) is the labour supply equation. 
2.2 Enterprise and the Environment 
Consistent with the standard New Keynesian framework, the enterprise sector is 
formed by final good and intermediate good producers. The final good 𝑌𝑡 is produced 
by competitive firms using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology 
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𝑌𝑡 = [∫ 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 𝜃𝑡−1 𝜃𝑡 𝑑𝑗10 ]  𝜃𝑡 𝜃𝑡−1 (5) 
where 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 denotes the intermediate goods produced by monopolistically competitive 
ﬁrms, the subscript 𝑗 ∈ [0,1] denotes the intermediate good firms of a continuum. 𝜃𝑡 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, and also a stochastic process that describe the 
cost-push shock (Smets and Wouters (2003)). It follows ln  𝜃𝑡 = 𝜌𝜃 ln  𝜃𝑡−1 +(1 − 𝜌𝜃) ln 𝜃 + 𝑒𝜃,𝑡 with 0 < 𝜌𝜃 < 1 and  𝑒𝜃,𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜃2). 
Final good producers maximise their profit which is determined by 𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 −∫ 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 𝜃𝑡−1 𝜃𝑡 𝑑𝑗10 (6) 
So, we have the first-order condition which yields the demand function for 
intermediate goods 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 𝜃𝑡 𝑌𝑡 (7) 
in which 𝑃𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝑗,𝑡1− 𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑗10 ] 11− 𝜃𝑡 (8) 
A typical intermediate good firm has a production function 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑗,𝑡 (9) 
where 𝐴𝑡 is the total factor productivity (TFP) factor or technology that follows a 
stochastic process ln 𝐴𝑡 = 𝜌𝐴 ln 𝐴𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝐴) ln 𝐴 + 𝑒𝐴,𝑡 , in which 0 < 𝜌𝐴 < 1 
and 𝑒𝐴,𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝐴2). Following Golosov et al. (2014), 𝛬𝑡 is a damage coefficient 
that describe the negative externality of GHG emission on productivity (via some 
channels including changing temperature). It is the pivot linking the economy and the 
environment. 𝛬𝑡 is determined by the stock of emission following 𝛬𝑡 = e−𝜒(𝑀𝑡−?̃?) (10) 
where 𝑀𝑡 is the stock of emission of period t, ?̃? is the level before the industrial 
revolution, and 𝜒>0 measures the intensity of negative externality. 
 According to Heutel (2012), GHG emission is a by-product of the production 
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process. The original emission from production is 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  which is proportional 
(measured by 𝜑) to the volume of output of intermediate firms 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 (11) 
To dispose the original emission, a firm has three compatible choices: emission 
abating, legally emitting and illegally emitting. A firm can choose to abate a percentage 
of 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 (0 ≤ 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 ≤ 1) of the original emission which will bring a marginal increasing 
cost of 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡, where 𝜙1 = 𝜙1′𝜑 > 0 and 𝜙2 > 1 are cost coefficients. A firm 
can also choose to legally emit some original emission. This requires a firm to pay the 
carbon tax or buy the emission permit (depending on the climate regime) at a price 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 
for every unit of GHG emission.  
The novel features we introduce into the model are the illegal (concealed) emission 
and the potential penalty for it. This relaxes the hidden assumption of the perfect 
effectiveness of environmental regulation in most previous E-DSGE models. In many 
countries especially developing ones like China, the environmental regulation on 
emission is not very strict. The government or the environmental authority cannot 
accurately spot or strictly limit the real emission of firms. So, firms have some space to 
emit more than the legal level which is the level they paid tax or bought permit, so that 
to save some cost for emission abating or legal emitting. This results in the illegally 
emission or the concealed emission. Meanwhile, although a government may not able 
to fully prohibit the illegal emission, normally they still have environmental regulation 
at some degree. This means they will monitor the firms and penalise them (by fining) 
if illegal emission is spotted (with probability).  
We assume that a firm faces an expected fine that equals to 𝜓2 𝑉𝑡,𝑗2 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡, where 0 ≤𝑉𝑡,𝑗 ≤ 1 is the proportion of illegal emission in the original emission. 𝜓 > 0 is defined 
as the “effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation” (“EOEER” for short) 
which is proportional to the probability of government to spot illegal emission and the 
amount of fine for every unit of illegal emission. The amount of total fine is marginally 
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increasing with regard to 𝑣𝑡,𝑗 because the more a firm emit illegally, the easier it can 
be spotted. The introduction of illegal emission and EOEER is nontrivial since they will 
make the regimes of climate policy more similar or more different, and further influence 
the dynamics of financial and economic variables (see Sub-Section 3.3). 
Now the three channels that firms can dispose their original emission, namely 
emission abating, legally emitting and illegally emitting, are all explained. This is 
helpful for illuminating the following variables. The real emission 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 is the amount 
of GHG that is really emitted to the atmosphere and can be monitored by the 
government. It equates the original emission 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  minus the abated emission 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑈𝑡,𝑗𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡. The claimed emission 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 is the amount of GHG emission 
that a firm reports to the government concealing its illegal emission 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 . It 
determines the amount of legal emission 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 and also the amount of tax or permit 
a firm needs to pay or buy (𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙). It equals to the real emission minus the illegal 
emission. Accordingly, we have 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 − 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡,𝑗)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 + 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 (12) 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 − 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 − 𝑉𝑡,𝑗)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 (13) 
The above relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The relationship among emission variables 
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙  
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
𝑈𝑡,𝑗 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 
1 − 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 − 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 
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Considering the cost of disposing emission via the three channels and the sticky 
pricing assumption in the standard New Keynesian framework (Rotemberg, 1982), the 
objective of an intermediate firm is to maximise 𝔼0 {∑Ω0,𝑡 [𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡]∞𝑡=0 } (14) 
which is subject to 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 (15) 
where Ω0,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡 𝐶0𝐶𝑡 is the stochastic discount factor.  
The above settings and assumptions yield the following first-order conditions (see 
Appendix) (1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(Π𝑡 − 1)Πt + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (Π𝑡+1 − 1)Π𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0 (16) 𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑡2𝜑 (17) 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 1𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1 (18) 𝑉𝑡 = 1𝜓𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝜓 (19) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑡  is the marginal cost of production, 𝛾 > 0  is the price adjusting cost 
coefficient, Π𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡−1 denotes inflation. Equation (16) is the New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve. 
2.3 Monetary and Environmental Authorities 
The monetary policy authority (central bank) decides nominal interest rate 
following a traditional Taylor rule 𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (Π𝑡Π )𝜌Π ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌 (20) 
where 𝑌𝑡 𝑛𝑎 is the natural output without price stickiness, 𝑅 and Π are the steady 
state of nominal interest rate and inflation, 𝜌Π and 𝜌𝑌 are the intensity coefficients 
for targeting on inflation and output gap. 
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The environmental authority decides the regime of climate policy. In this research 
we consider two major regimes: cap-and-trade (“CA” for short) and carbon tax (“TX” 
for short). Under the CA regime, the environmental authority sets an emission cap  𝑍𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝  and sell emission permit to the market on a price decided by the market 
competition. In equilibrium, the total legal emission 𝑍𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 equates 𝑍𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝. Under the 
TX regime, the authority set a fixed carbon tax level for every unit of legal emission. 
The authority does not set a ceiling for total legal emission. As stated earlier, the 
environmental authority also monitors the firms and fine them if illegal emission is 
spotted, however, their effectiveness of enforcement (EOEER) is exogenously 
determined by the governance capacity of the country. The earnings of the authority 
including the income from selling emission permit or levying carbon tax and from the 
fine are transferred to households directly. 
2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation 
In equilibrium, we have the market clearing condition 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (Π𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡 (21) 
We assume all the firms are symmetrical following Rotemberg (1982). So, the 
gross variables share the same form of expressions with individual variables. The total 
production function is 𝑌𝑡 = Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡 (22) 
The totalities of emission are 𝑍𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 = ∫ 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑗10 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 (23) 𝑍𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = ∫ 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑗10 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 (24) 
The total transfer is 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝑍𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 + 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑡 (25) 
The total stock of emission is 𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝑍𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 + ?̃? (26) 
where ?̃? is the emission from the nature without human influence, 0 < 𝛿𝑀 < 1 is the 
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natural decay rate of GHG stock. 
2.5 Calibration 
We calibrate the parameters as follow and list them in Table 1. Following Gali 
(2015), discount factor 𝛽 is set as 0.99, elasticity of substitution in steady state 𝜃 is 
set as 6, inverse of the Frisch elasticity 𝜂 is set as 1. The adjusting cost coefficient 𝛾 
which measures price stickiness is set as 58.25 so that the stickiness has a duration of 
three quarters when it is converted into Calvo pricing. The disutility coefficient of 
labour 𝜇𝐿 is set as 24.9983 so that the steady-state of labour is 0.2 without monopoly. 
Following tradition, the persistent coefficients of shocks (including TFP shock, 
preference shock and cost-push shock) are set as 0.9, the Taylor-rule elasticities 
(coefficients) of monetary policy 𝜌Π and 𝜌𝑌 are set as 1.5 and 0.5 respectively in 
Section 3. Following Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017), the scale coefﬁcient of 
abatement cost 𝜙1 is set as 0.185 and the elasticity 𝜙2 is set as 2.8. The parameter 
determining the damage caused by emission on output 𝜒 is set as 0.000457. Following 
Heutel (2012), the decay rate of emission stock 𝛿𝑀 is set as 0.0021. Following Xu et. 
al (2016), the coefﬁcient measuring the original emission per unit of output 𝜑 is set as 
0.601. As to the effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation (EOEER) 𝜓, 
according to the proportion of environmental punishment cost in total GDP in China 
which is around 0.01%7, 𝜓 should be around 0.45. This is within the magnitude of 0.1 
to 1. For comparison propose, we need to set a large 𝜓 and a small 𝜓. Considering 
the magnitude, the benchmark of 𝜓 (in Sub-Section 3.1 and 3.2) is set as 1 which is 
the upper bound of the magnitude, and the value describing a relative ineffective 
regulation is set as 0.1 (in Section 3.3) which is the lower bound. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The State Council of China http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-02/26/content_5368758.htm  
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Table 1: Calibrated values of the parameters 
Parameter Value Target 𝛽 Discount factor 0.99 Risk free rate 𝜂 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity, 1 Literature 𝜇𝐿 Disutility coefficient of labour 24.9983 Steady labour time is 0.2 
under fully competition 
market 𝜃 Elasticity of substitution in steady 
state 
6 Literature 𝛾 Adjusting cost coefficient of sticky 
price 
58.25 Literature 𝜌𝐴 Persistent coefficient of TFP shocks. 0.9 Commonly used value 𝜌𝑆 Persistent coefficient of preference 
shocks. 
0.9 Commonly used value 𝜌𝜃 Persistent coefficient of cost-push 
shocks. 
0.9 Commonly used value 𝜙1 Scale coefﬁcient of abatement cost 0.185 Literature 𝜙2 Elasticity of abatement cost 2.8 Literature 𝜒 Intensity of negative externality 0.000457 Literature 𝜑 Emissions per unit of output in the 
absence of abatement 
0.601 Literature 𝜓 EOEER 0.1, 1 Proportion of environmental 
punishment cost in GDP 𝛿𝑀 Decay rate of GHG stock 0.0021 Literature 
A TFP in steady state 5.1151 Steady output is 1 under 
fully competition market 
S Preference in steady state 1 No influence at steady state 𝜌Π Policy Response to Inﬂation 0.5 Literature 𝜌𝑌 Policy Response to Output Gap 1.5 Literature 
 
3. The Mixes of Monetary Policy with Different Climate 
Policy 
In this section, we mix the monetary policy with four different types of climate 
policies: cap-and-trade, carbon tax, no control (with climate policy absent), and Ramsey 
optimal which constitute four regimes, and compare the mixes in terms of differences 
in fluctuation and welfare. We will also consider the differences brought by the 
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(in)effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation. The comparison in this 
section will show if and how the monetary policy will differ when the type of climate 
policy and the effectiveness of environmental regulation is different. 
3.1 Fluctuation Comparison 
Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017) investigated the mixes of monetary policy and 
climate policy by giving one policy as Ramsey type and the other as varying types. 
They showed that key macroeconomic variables including labour, emission, interest 
rate, inflation have different response to productivity shock when policy type differs. 
Their analysis can be extended in three aspects. First, at least one policy was 
assumed as Ramsey type in any regime they studied. This kind of policy mix is the ideal 
optimisation and difficult to carry out directly in the reality. The practically realizable 
“optimal mix” is not studied. So, more real-world practicable policy mixes can be 
investigated. Second, the potential ineffectiveness of environmental regulation that will 
cause illegal emission and change the dynamics of the economy can be considered. This 
relaxes the hidden assumption on the perfect effectiveness of environmental regulation. 
Third, the regime with “no climate policy” and “Ramsey climate policy” can be 
introduced into the comparison to serve as benchmarks. 
We extend Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017)’s work by comparing the mixes of 
Taylor rule type monetary policy with four different types of climate policy (therefore 
constituting four regimes) with the consideration of the effectiveness of enforcement of 
environmental regulation. The four types of climate policy include cap-and-trade, 
carbon tax, no control (with climate policy absent) and Ramsey optimal (see Appendix 
for equations). The first three and the Taylor rule monetary policy are all practicable in 
the real-world. In this sub-section, we compare the fluctuation of economy in different 
regimes by conducting impulse response analysis. To be specific, we give 1% positive 
TFP shock and find the dynamics of economic variables afterwards. The EOEER 𝜓 is 
set as 1 here as a benchmark. The values of tax level and emission target are set so that 
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all regimes (except for the No Control regime (“NO” for short)8) share the same steady 
state with the case of Ramsey. 
The results of impulse response analysis (absolute deviation from steady states) 
are show in Figure 2. It can be found that the responses of endogenous variables to the 
shock have different paths under the four different regimes. For economic and monetary 
variables, output under the cap-and-trade regime (CA) decrease more than the Ramsey 
optimal regime (RM), while under the carbon tax regime (TX) decrease less than RM. 
TFP damage coefficient (𝛬𝑡), inflation together and the resulting interest rate under CA 
drop less than under RM, while under TX the negative changes are larger than the case 
under RM. The differences in output, inflation and interest rate among regimes are not 
big. For environmental related variables, abatement, illegal emission and emission price 
under CA rise more than under RM, while under TX they change less than under RM 
or even do not change. Legal emission and real emission under TX increase more than 
under RM, while under CA real emission rise less than under RM and legal emission 
does not change. The differences among regimes in environmental variables are more 
significant than in economic and monetary variables. 
                                                 
8 The No Control regime is equivalent to a carbon tax regime with a tax level a 0. This makes the 
steady state different. 
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Figure 2: The dynamic of endogenous variables after 1% positive TFP shock under 
different regimes (EOEER=1) 
 
To understand the mechanism behind the differences of the changes, we first need 
to understand that after a positive TFP shock, emission price and real emission under 
RM will rise. When the shock happens, every unit of output will have a lower cost. 
This decreases the price level and increases the demand. An increased demand causes 
an increased supply or output. When the level of output increases, the original emission 
from production also increase. This can cause a higher marginal damage to TFP so the 
Ramsey optimization requires a higher rate of abatement 𝑈𝑡. According to equation 
(18), the emission price 𝒑𝒁,𝒕 also needs to be higher simultaneously under RM. To 
dispose the extra original emission from production under RM, firms will be arranged 
to use all three channels, namely abating, legally emitting and illegally emitting, since 
all the channels have an increasing marginal cost for the society. Hence, abatement, 
legal emission, and illegal emission will all rise. As a result, real emission, which 
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equates the sum of legal and illegal emission, will also rise under RM.  
Then the differences between CA and TX can be explained. Under TX (and NO), 
the emission price (for legal emission) is fixed at the carbon tax level (or 0) no matter 
how much firms emit. After shock, this is lower than the Ramsey optimal (increased) 
emission price. The relative lower emission price has three implications. (1) On output. 
The emission price is fixed hence its marginal level is also fixed and equates to the tax 
level. At optimum, the costs of all three channels for disposing the original emission 
from production share this same marginal level. The costs for disposing every unit of 
emission via illegal emitting and abatement are marginal increasing, hence the average 
cost of these two channels are lower than the tax level. Given the tax level is lower than 
the Ramsey optimal emission price, the average cost for disposing every unit of 
emission via all the three channels is less than the case under RM. When the unit 
emission cost is lower, the price level decreases which causes a higher demand for 
production output. So, it is higher than the case under RM. (2) On real emission and 
TFP damage coefficient. The relative lower disposing costs of legal and illegal 
emitting allow real emission which is the sum of legal and illegal emission rises more 
than the case under RM. Real emission accumulates into emission stock and directly 
decreases TFP damage coefficient (N.B. it is negative). Therefore, TFP damage 
coefficient drops more than it under RM. (3) On legal emission, abatement and illegal 
emission. With a lower emission price, the legal emission increases more than it under 
RM. When relatively more original emission from production is disposed by the legal 
emitting channel, less of it needs to be disposed by the other two channels, namely 
abating and illegal emitting. This causes the abatement and illegal emission to increase 
less than the case under RM. (4) On inflation and interest rate. A lower than RM 
emission price causes a lower marginal cost of production, then lower inflation and 
interest rate in succession. Hence, both the change in inflation and interest rate is lower 
than the case under RM. 
Under CA, the mechanism of change is the antithesis of TX. The legal emission 
volume is fixed at emission target, so it is lower than the new Ramsey optimal 
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(increased) legal emission level. After the shock and the rise of original emission, the 
illegal emitting and abatement channels need to dispose more emission than the case 
under RM. This brings a higher marginal disposing costs of these two channels. At 
optimum, the costs of all three channels for disposing the original emission share a same 
marginal level, hence emission price (for legal emission) rises higher than the case 
under RM. The higher than RM emission price (which is opposite to the lower than RM 
price under TX) has implications on endogenous variable that is exactly antithetical to 
those in the TX. Therefore, we can see the differences of change between CA and TX. 
Meanwhile, we can say that there exists a “cost-offsetting” effect in the CA regime 
which can better stabilize the economy when shock happens. This is because the fixed 
legal emission volume causes a higher/lower price for disposing emission and offsets 
the lowering/heightening price level (and also attenuates monetary policy). Under the 
TX regime, the fixed carbon price does not have such function.  
In general, the above analysis shows that when monetary policy is mixed with 
different climate policy, the monetary policy itself (interest rate) and policies’ effect on 
the economy (other endogenous variables) will differ facing TPF shock. Under TX the 
monetary policy (interest rate) is strengthened compared with RM; while the TX type 
climate policy is looser than the RM type (real emission too more and abatement too 
less). On the opposite, under CA the monetary policy is weakened; the CA type climate 
policy is tighter than the RM type.  
The above analysis conveys two key messages: (1) The cap-and-trade regime of 
climate policy could be an attenuator for monetary policy. (2) The design of monetary 
policy should consider the existing regime of climate policy since the dynamic of 
monetary policy is influenced by the selection of climate policy. 
3.2 Welfare Comparison 
To further investigate the above policy mixes, we compare the welfare of the four 
regimes in addition to the above fluctuation analysis. This will help us find which mix 
among the four is better and which is worse.  
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In the comparison, we maintain all parameters including the coefficients in the 
Taylor rule and the EOEER fixed. We set the steady states of CA and TX equalling to 
RM’s. The steady state of NO comes from the 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 0 case of TX. So, the differences 
in welfare among CA, TX and RM is only caused by the difference in regime. We follow 
Mendicino and Pescatori (2007)’s welfare criterion and calculate the conditional 
welfare of individual. The expression is 𝑊𝑗 = 𝔼𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑚 (ln 𝐶𝑗,𝑡+𝑚 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑗,𝑡+𝑚1+𝜂1 + 𝜂)∞𝑚=0 (27) 
where 𝑊𝑗 is the conditional welfare, 𝑗 = {NO, TX, CA, RM}  means the four regimes 
of climate policy: no control, carbon tax, cap-and-trade and Ramsey optimal.  
In order to show more intuitive results, we also calculate the consumption 
equivalents (CE) of each case. CE is the additional fraction of consumption that 
households under no policy can obtain if a certain policy is introduced for them. Let 𝑊𝑗′ = 𝔼𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑚 [ln(1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑗′)𝐶𝑁𝑂,𝑡+𝑚 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑁𝑂,𝑡+𝑚1+𝜂1+𝜂 ]∞𝑚=0 (28)  
we have 𝐶𝐸𝑗′ = exp{(1 − 𝛽)(𝑊𝑗′ −𝑊𝑁𝑂)} − 1 (29) 
where  𝑗′ = {TX, CA, RM} represents a certain regime of climate policy. 
The welfares of all four regimes and the corresponding CEs is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Welfare and Consumption Equivalent of the four regimes 
 
Welfare CE 
NO -59.469 0 
TX -58.583 0.0088972 
CA -58.585 0.0088727 
RM -58.566 0.0090715 
 
We can find 𝑊𝑅𝑀 > 𝑊𝑇𝑋 > 𝑊𝐶𝐴 > 𝑊𝑁𝑂 (30) 
and 
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𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑀 > 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋 > 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 > 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑂 (31) 
In specific, (1) Any regime with climate policy has a better welfare than NO since 
any climate policy can somehow reduce emission and so do its externality. (2) RM has 
the highest welfare and CE among all regimes. This is the nature of Ramsey policy. (3) 
CA is a little better than TX in terms of welfare and CE, however, the differences 
between them are not big. 
TX tends to be a better choice among the three real-world achievable regimes (CA, 
TX and NO) when TFP shock happens in terms of the welfare standard. However, 
according to sensitivity analysis, it is not always the best choice. We find that when the 
parameter EOEER is small enough or the shock is changed to demand-type, the result 𝑊𝑇𝑋 > 𝑊𝐶𝐴  and 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋 > 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴  will reverse to 𝑊𝑇𝑋 < 𝑊𝐶𝐴  and 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋 < 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 . 
Hence, no mix of policy is always dominant to others regardless of parameters and 
shocks. This means that there is no absolute or “unconstrained” optimal mix of 
monetary and climate policy that is implementable in the real-world in terms of welfare 
standard. When parameters or shock changes, the optimal mix could change to another 
form. In Sub-Section 4.1, we will try to find “constrained” optimal mixes by optimising 
policy coefficients in given regimes of policy mix. 
3.3 The Role of Environment Regulatory Effectiveness 
This section tries to find that if the effectiveness of enforcement of environmental 
regulation, in addition to the choice of climate policy type, will also bring differences 
to the economy and the monetary policy. 
To do this, we set a lower effectiveness parameter 𝜓 equalling to 0.1. This is a 
much smaller value than the benchmark case in Sub-Section 3.1 where 𝜓 = 1. The 
small value means the environmental regulation is less effective. As in Figure 3, we 
show the fluctuation of economy following the same way in Sub-Section 3.1. It needs 
to be noted that the units of some vertical-axis in Figure 2 and Figure 3 are different. 
Then, we compare the results in Figure 2 (𝜓 = 1) and in Figure 3 (𝜓 = 0.1) to find any 
differences brought by the effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation. 
 21 
 
It can be found that when the effectiveness is lower, for variables excepting legal 
and illegal emission, the differences of fluctuation between CA and TX becomes 
smaller – mainly because that the variables’ paths under CA move more approximate 
to the paths under TX. For legal emission, under TX it changes more than the case when 
environmental regulation is more effective. For illegal emission, under CA it changes 
more. 
 
Figure 3: The dynamic of endogenous variables after 1% positive TFP shock under 
different regimes (EOEER=0.1) 
  
The pivotal reason of the changed differences is that the less effective of 
enforcement of environmental regulation gives firms more space to dispose their 
emission via the illegal emitting channel. When 𝜓 is lower, the unit cost for illegal 
emission and the total cost for disposing every unit of original emission will decrease. 
This allows the steady state share of illegal emission in original emission (i.e. 𝑉𝑡) and 
original emission to increase. After TFP shock under TX, illegal emission rises more 
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than the case with higher 𝜓 because of the increased steady state 𝑉𝑡 . The path of 
abatement is almost not changed because the extra original emission after shock does 
not change significantly, and the share of abatement for disposing every unit of original 
emission (i.e.  𝑈𝑡) is not changed according to equation (18) which does not include 𝜓. The path of real emission whose share is 1 − 𝑈𝑡 neither changed significantly for 
the same reason. The legal emission rises less since its share in disposing every unit of 
original emission 1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡  is decreased due to an increased 𝑉𝑡 . The paths of 
inflation and interest rate are almost not changed due to a fixed 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 under TX. 
After TFP shock under CA, 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 increases less than the case when 𝜓 is higher 
since the cost for illegal emission rises less9. This brings more similar changes in the 
path of inflation and interest rate. Illegal emission rises more than the case with higher 𝜓  for the same reason under TX. Abatement increases less since more original 
emission is disposed by the illegal emitting channel. Real emission rises more since the 
illegal emission increased more and the legal emission is fixed under CA. 
Besides the fluctuation analysis, we also calculate and compare the welfare of each 
regime after the EOEER is changed to 0.1 . We find that the order of welfare and 
consumption equivalent comparison will change to 𝑊𝐸𝑇 > 𝑊𝑇𝑋 and 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 > 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋. 
The reason is that consumption, as one of the determinants of welfare, is increased more 
under CA than under TX. A lower 𝜓 brings a lower cost for illegal emission. Under 
CA this also brings a lower 𝑝𝑍,𝑡. Then price level decreases; demand, production output 
and consumption increase. However, under TX, 𝑝𝑍,𝑡  is fixed, hence price level 
decreases not as much as the case under CA. Then consumption does not rise so much.10 
The output under CA rises more than it under TX after shock, which makes the output 
                                                 
9 There is a marginal increasing cost for illegal emission 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡,𝑗2 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡. When 𝜓 is lower, the steady 
state cost for illegal emission is lower. Hence the cost for illegal emission rises less here. Meanwhile, at 
optimal, the three channels for disposing original pollution have a same marginal cost, hence 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 equals 
to the cost for illegal emission. 
10 The fluctuation of price also influences welfare according to Rotemberg (1982). However, the 
result here means the influence of consumption on welfare is stronger. 
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gap under CA relatively smaller and welfare larger.  
The above analysis shows that the ineffectiveness of enforcement of environmental 
regulation will make climate policy less effective and different regimes become more 
similar by giving more space for illegal emission. This implies that the economy and 
the monetary policy will fluctuate differently when the EOEER is different. The extent 
of the attenuation effect of climate policy on monetary policy will be changed by the 
strength of EOEER. Therefore, in addition to the type of climate policy, the 
effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation also needs to be considered 
when designing monetary policy. Otherwise, the dynamic of monetary policy and its 
effect on the economy will be somewhat different (too strong or too weak) from what 
is originally envisaged. This should be particularly noticed by the authorities of 
developing countries like China. 
4. The Optimisation of Policy Mixes 
It is found from Sub-Section 3.2 that there is no realistic and “unconstrained” 
optimal mix of monetary and climate policy in terms of welfare standard. In this section, 
we try to find the “constrained” optimal mixes by optimising policy coefficients in the 
traditional Taylor rule of monetary policy under given regimes. We also investigate a 
radically “climate-friendly” way to improve the policy mix. This is to introduce the 
emission control (i.e. climate change mitigation) target into the Taylor rule of monetary 
policy. We will see if it can become a useful practice and try to find the optimal 
coefficient for the new target. 
4.1 Optimisation in the Traditional Monetary Policy 
The Ramsey optimal monetary and climate policy (RM) is the ideally optimal 
policy mix. However, it is difficult for policy makers to carry out in the reality since the 
RM assumes that all endogenous variables in the economy can be controlled and 
adjusted by the authority. 
The realistic way to improve or to optimise the policy mix is to choose between 
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the CA and TX (and NO) regime or (and) to adjust the policy coefficients in them. It 
was found from Sub-Section 3.2 that there is no “unconstrained” optimal mix (regime) 
of monetary and climate policy in terms of welfare standard. So, we can only adjust the 
parameters in a given regime to improve itself. This is to find the “constrained” optimal 
mix. To do this, we have three potential options. The first is to give a fixed strength of 
climate policy (carbon price level or emission cap fixed) and optimise the coefficients 
in the Taylor rule of monetary policy (𝜌𝑌 and 𝜌Π). The second is to fix the monetary 
policy coefficients and optimise the climate policy strength. The third is to optimise the 
climate strength and the monetary coefficients simultaneously. We choose the first 
method since it is the financial regulator who recently and prominently wants to know 
what monetary policy needs to do facing the climate problem. The second method is on 
the angle of environmental regulator. The third is more comprehensive however more 
complex and difficult for policy makers to coordinate and carry out.  
We combine different values of monetary policy coefficients with different types 
of climate policy (CA or TX) under different EOEER and shocks to form the candidates 
of regime with “constrained” optimal policy mix. Shocks include TFP, cost-push and 
preference shock since these three can cover both supply and demand side shocks. Then, 
we calculate the welfare and CE of every candidate of regime. If there is a maximum 
of welfare and CE under certain climate policy, EOEER and shock, the corresponding 
policy coefficients 𝜌π  and 𝜌𝑌 are the (constrained) optimal values of that regime. For 
simplicity, we only consider the regimes that can solve the model with a unique solution. 
We find that under cost-push shock (a positive 𝜃𝑡 shock), there exist optimal 
monetary policy coefficients for every climate policy and EOEER, as shown in Table 
3. This means that if the cost-push shock is dominant in the economy, the central bank 
has a best choice of coefficients in the Taylor rule of monetary policy, when climate 
policy and EOEER is given. 
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Table 3: Optimal policy coefficients in the Taylor rule of monetary policy under 
different climate policy and EOEER (cost-push shock) 𝜑 Cap-and-Trade Carbon Tax 𝜌π  𝜌𝑌 𝜌π  𝜌𝑌 
0.1 3.2335 0.4573 3.4792 0.4591 
0.5 2.8024 0.4573 3.4948 0.4593 
1 2.6819 0.4589 3.4969 0.4593 
10 2.5549 0.4619 3.4984 0.4593 
100 2.5418 0.4624 3.4985 0.4591 
 
We can find from Table 3 that 𝜌𝑌 does not vary significantly across climate policy 
regimes, however, 𝜌Π is always larger under TX than under CA. This is because the 
emission price in the CA regime changes when shock happens. When cost-push shock 
(a positive 𝜃𝑡 shock) happens, the price level becomes lower which causes a higher 
demand, production output and emission. The higher emission then causes a higher 
price for disposing emission under CA (see Sub-Section 3.1 for detail). Hence the price 
level under TX (which is fixed) is relatively lower than the case under CA. To suppress 
deflation, a stronger 𝜌Π is needed. This again shows the “cost-offsetting” effect in the 
CA and the basic mechanism that differs the two climate regimes. 
Under TFP and preference shocks, we find that the welfare and CE becomes higher 
when 𝜌π  and 𝜌𝑌 become larger. This is a common result of the New-Keynesian 
model. However, this means there is no optimal values of 𝜌π  and 𝜌𝑌 if the ranges of 
the coefficients are not limited and TFP (or preference) shock is dominant in the 
economy. 
To summarise, it is found that when climate policy is considered, the monetary 
policy can be improved by adjusting Taylor rule coefficients. If the cost-push shock is 
dominant in the economy, there exists optimal coefficients. Both the regime of climate 
policy and the EOEER can affect the value of the optimal coefficients. Till this section, 
we can also summarise that when the existing climate policy is brought into the 
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framework of central bank’s policy making, at least three things can be considered to 
improve the monetary policy: the type (regime) of climate policy, the effectiveness of 
enforcement of environmental regulation and the coefficient in the Taylor rule of 
monetary policy. 
4.2 Monetary Policy Pegging on Emission 
In this section, we turn to a radical way to optimise the traditional policy mix. This 
is to change the form of the Taylor rule of monetary policy by incorporating the 
emission control target into it. Considering central banks’ recent interest in helping 
solve the climate change problem, this will help answer their question of “if it is good 
for central bank to use the monetary policy to proactively take care for the environment”. 
Our method is to add the emission gap as a third target into the traditional inflation 
and output gap targeting Taylor rule. The new form of the Taylor rule is 𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (Π𝑡Π )𝜌Π ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌 (𝑍𝑡−1𝑍 )𝜌𝑍 (32) 
where 𝑌𝑡 𝑛𝑎 is the natural output without nominal price stickiness, and 𝑅, Π, 𝑍 are 
the steady states of nominal interest rate, inflation rate and real emission respectively. 
The 𝑍𝑡−1 is the real emission of one period earlier. The real emission target is not a 
replication of the output target since it is not the original emission that is proportional 
to output. Meanwhile, the real emission has direct effect on the environment so it can 
reflect the environmental objective. We assume the authority uses 𝑍𝑡−1 not 𝑍𝑡 to 
form the emission target since the real emission includes the illegal emission which is 
often concealed and cannot be detected at the period of policy making. This new form 
of Taylor rule makes the monetary policy proactively take care for the environment. 
Then, we set the inflation and the output coefficient as fixed: 𝜌𝑌 = 0.5 and 𝜌Π =1.5; Calculate welfare values of the economy with different 𝜌𝑍 and different shocks. 𝜌𝑍  is taken ergodic of the its interval that can produce a unique solution for the 
equilibrium. Common shocks (TFP, cost-push and preference) that cover both supply 
and demand side shocks are introduced respectively. Under a same shock, if the welfare 
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with a 𝜌𝑍 is higher than the welfare with 𝜌𝑍 = 0, a 𝜌𝑍  that can improve the policy 
mix is found. As 𝜌𝑌 and 𝜌Π are fixed and allowing 𝜌𝑍 to change is introducing a 
new dimension for optimisation, there must be some 𝜌𝑍 that can improve the welfare 
by serving as a supplement of the potential over-strong or over-weak 𝜌𝑌 and 𝜌Π. 
By the above method, we find the intervals of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve the welfare, 
as well as the values of 𝜌𝑍 that can enhance the welfare at the greatest extent (i.e. the 
optimized value of 𝜌𝑍 ) under different regimes with different shocks (as shown in 
Table 4). When the TFP or cost-push shock is dominant, the optimal 𝜌𝑍 is negative in 
the both climate regimes. When the preference shock is dominant, the optimal 𝜌𝑍 lie 
in the right boundary of possible values which means the higher 𝜌𝑍 is, the higher 
welfare will be.  
Table 4: The interval of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve welfare and optimal 𝜌𝑍 under different 
climate policy and shock (original price stickiness) 
Shock Cap-and-Trade Carbon Tax Interval Optimal Interval Optimal 
TFP shock (-0.866, 0) -0.453 (-0.174, 0) -0.091 
Cost-push shock (-0.509, 0) -0.261 (-0.12, 0) -0.062 
Preference shock The high the better 
 
Except with preference shock, the optimal 𝜌𝑍 can also be positive with other 
shocks if parameter changes. We find that if the price stickiness parameter 𝛾 is large 
enough (e.g. 10 times larger which is roughly in line with Gertler (2019)), the optimal 𝜌𝑍 becomes positive under both regimes with cost-push shock, as shown in Table 5.  
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Table 5: The interval of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve welfare and optimal 𝜌𝑍 under different 
climate policy and shock (price stickiness 10 times larger) 
Shock Cap-and-Trade Carbon Tax Interval Optimal Interval Optimal 
TFP shock (-0.934, 0) -0.508 (-0.16, 0) -0.087 
Cost-push shock (0, 1.342) 0.602 (0, 0.184) 0.085 
Preference shock The high the better 
 
We must point out that when the optimal 𝜌𝑍 is negative, there is a dilemma 
between the welfare objective and the environmental objective. With a positive TFP or 
cost-push shock, the emission gap is positive due to the lower price level, higher output 
and emission. A negative 𝜌𝑍  will derive a lower interest rate which encourages 
demand and production and causes a higher emission. The higher emission is on the 
contrary of the environmental protection objective. Under this circumstance, if we 
change the 𝜌𝑍 to a positive value to realise the environmental objective (emission 
control), the welfare enhancing objective cannot be achieved. Failing to enhance 
welfare is incompatible with the traditional mandate of a central bank. So, it is doubtful 
to adopt the emission control target into the Taylor rule of monetary policy when the 
optimal 𝜌𝑍 is negative. 
Only when the optimal 𝜌𝑍 is positive, improving the welfare by including the 
emission control target can simultaneously reduce emission. The welfare objective can 
be consistent with the environmental objective. On this occasion, the adoption of the 
emission control target into the Taylor rule of monetary policy is worth considering by 
the central bank for both the welfare and the environmental reason.  
This section shows that changing the form of the Taylor rule of monetary policy 
by incorporating the emission control target into it can improve the policy mix in terms 
of welfare standard. The optimal value of the coefficient for targeting is found under 
different situations. However, under certain circumstances, this radically “climate-
friendly” monetary policy will bring a dilemma between the welfare and the 
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environmental objective, which makes it incompatible with the tradition mandate of 
central bank. 
The analysis implies an answer to the question “if it is good for central bank to use 
the monetary policy to proactively take care for the environment”: In terms of both 
welfare and environmental objective and by using a Taylor rule with emission control 
target, the answer is “yes”, under certain shocks (e.g. cost-push shock) and parameters 
(e.g. a relatively high price stickiness); the answer will be “maybe not”, under other 
shocks (e.g. TFP shock) and parameters (e.g. a relatively low price stickiness). 
In the real world, one certain shock cannot always be dominant in the economy 
and it is difficult to change the form of monetary policy rule frequently. If we do not 
want to bring more dilemmas and difficulties to the central bank, it is better not to 
choose the radically “climate-friendly” rule of monetary policy. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied the relationship between monetary and climate policy 
and tried to find their optimal mix in an E-DSGE model with illegal emission and 
related regulation augmented. Using this model, we have compared the mixes of 
monetary policy with different climate policy to find whether and how climate policy 
will influence monetary policy; optimised the coefficients in the monetary policy rule 
under certain climate policy; given a climate-proactive monetary policy and 
investigated if and when it can be a good choice for the central bank. 
Main findings include three parts. First, the dynamic of monetary policy is 
influenced by the selection of regimes of climate policy and the effectiveness of 
enforcement of environmental regulation. The pivotal reason of the difference between 
regimes is that the cap-and-trade regime can offset the fluctuation of price after shocks, 
while the carbon tax regime cannot. The effectiveness of environmental regulation also 
plays a role since it can make climate policy less effective by giving more space for 
illegal emission. 
 30 
 
Second, there is no unconstrained optimal mix of monetary and climate policy that 
is implementable in the real-world, however, the coefficients in the traditional Taylor 
rule of monetary policy can be better set to enhance welfare when a certain regime of 
climate policy is given in the economy. If the cost-push shock is dominant in the 
economy, there exists optimal coefficients. Both the regime of climate policy and the 
effectiveness of environmental regulation can affect the value of the optimal 
coefficients. We can summarise from the above that, under the framework with climate 
factors, at least three things can be considered to improve the monetary policy: the type 
(regime) of climate policy, the effectiveness of enforcement of environmental 
regulation and the coefficient in the Taylor rule of monetary policy. 
Third, if the mitigation of climate change is augmented into the target of monetary 
policy, the economy’s welfare can be enhanced. The optimal value of the coefficient 
for targeting is found under different situations. However, under some circumstances, 
this radically “climate-friendly” monetary policy will bring a dilemma between the 
welfare and the environmental objective, which makes it incompatible with the tradition 
mandate of central bank. If we do not want to bring more difficulties to the central bank, 
it is better not to choose the “climate-friendly” rule of monetary policy. 
The overall conclusion is that the design of monetary policy should consider the 
existing climate policy, otherwise, the dynamic of monetary policy and its effect on the 
economy will be different from what is originally envisaged. After this consideration, 
a given regime of policy mix can be improved by adjusting the coefficients in the 
monetary policy rule. Adding the climate target into the monetary policy rule may not 
be desirable. 
Although the “climate-friendly” monetary policy is found to be controversial in 
this research, it does not mean this kind of monetary policy is useless from other angles 
of view. The DSGE model is mainly used for short-term analysis so the conclusions are 
mainly based on short-terms standards. Climate change could be a long-term problem 
for mankind. Considering that the “climate-friendly” monetary policy can support a 
green economic transition and reduce future climate risk, it could be a preferable choice 
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in the long-run. From this angle, it is not conflict with the mandate of central bank.  
 This research can be extended in several aspects. For example: (1) Set EOEER as 
a shock to study the “transition risk” brought by climate change and the tightening 
process of environmental regulation (e.g. China’s environmental inspection). (2) Set 
dynamic rule (e.g. Taylor rule) for climate policy. (3) Change the emission gap target 
in monetary policy to other forms. (4) Introduce more types of shocks in the study of 
economic fluctuation. (5) Introduced more financial fractions and features to describe 
the role of monetary policy more precise. (6) Besides the monetary policy, introduce 
and study more policy tools and measures that central banks can use to prevent climate 
risk and support the green economic transition (e.g. identifying green financing and 
differentiating reserve rate requirement, re-lending and collateral requirement (Pan, 
2019), asset purchase and credit guidance) 
 
Appendix 
Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
The maximization problem of firm 𝑗 is 
{   
   
  𝑉0 = max𝔼0 {∑Ω0,𝑡 [𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡]∞𝑡=0 }
𝑠. 𝑡. {  
  𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑗,𝑡𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 𝜃𝑡 𝑌𝑡  
 
We can rewrite the objective function by Bellman Equation as 𝑉𝑡 = max {𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡𝛺𝑡,𝑡+1𝑉𝑡+1} 
Which yields the Lagrangian function as 
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ℒ𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − [𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡]− 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡[𝛺𝑡,𝑡+1𝑉𝑡+1] + 𝜆𝑗,𝑡 [(𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 𝜃𝑡 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑗,𝑡] 
where 𝛺𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount factor. So, we can obtain the FOC for 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑉𝑗,𝑡 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 𝜙1𝜙2𝜑 𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2−1 𝑉𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝜓  
and derives 𝑀𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 1Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑 
The FOCs for 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 derive 1 − 𝜃𝑡 − 𝛾 ( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1) 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼𝑡 [(𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1𝑃𝑗,𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1𝑃𝑗,𝑡 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 0 
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Equation Systems of First Order Conditions 
Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Cap-and-Trade Climate Policy 
{  
   
   
  
   
   
   
 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1(1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(𝛱𝑡 − 1)𝛱𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (𝛱𝑡+1 − 1)𝛱𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝜙1?̃?𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑 + 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡2𝜑𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (𝛱𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡𝑍 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑈𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑌𝑡 = 𝑒−𝜒(𝑀𝑡−?̃?)𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 1𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1𝑣𝑡 = 1𝜓𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝜓𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (𝛱𝑡𝛱)𝜌𝛱 ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌
 
Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Carbon Tax Climate Policy 
{  
    
   
  
    
    
 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1(1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(𝛱𝑡 − 1)𝛱𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (𝛱𝑡+1 − 1)𝛱𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝜙1𝑈𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈 − 𝑣)𝜑 + 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑣2𝜑𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (𝛱𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑈)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑌𝑡 = 𝑒−𝜒(𝑀𝑡−?̃?)𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑝𝑍 = 1𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝜙2−1𝑣 = 1𝜓𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝜙2−1 = 𝑝𝑍𝜓𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (𝛱𝑡𝛱)𝜌𝛱 ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌
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Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix No Control Climate Policy 
No control policy is a special case of the carbon tax policy with 𝑝𝑍 = 0 . The 
equation system is all the same with the “Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Carbon Tax 
Climate Policy” except 𝑝𝑍 is set as 0. 
Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Ramsey Optimal Climate Policy 𝔼𝑡∑𝛽𝑡 (ln𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑡1+𝜂1 + 𝜂)∞𝑡=0
𝑠. 𝑡.
{  
   
  
   
   
 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1(1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(𝛱𝑡 − 1)𝛱𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (𝛱𝑡+1 − 1)𝛱𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝜙1?̃?𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑 + 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡2𝜑𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (𝛱𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑈𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑌𝑡 = 𝑒−𝜒(𝑀𝑡−?̃?)𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (𝛱𝑡𝛱)𝜌𝛱 ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌
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